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Determinism
The grand question of whether people have free will
turns out to be not one but several different questions.
We have been challenged and excited to work on
them, and we are honored to benefit from the
commentaries by such distinguished thinkers as Mele,
Holton, and Nahmias. In this brief article we say how
we have benefited from their comments.
Mismatched Conceptions and Misconceptions
One key point that came up in all the commentaries was
that there is a mismatch between what skeptical
scientists mean by free will and what the general public
understands. Nahmias articulated this most forcefully.
Scientists may say that free will is an illusion, and by
thattheymeanthatscience has noplace for supernatural
entities that mysteriously intervene in the flow of events
to override physical causality and natural law. But when
many laypersons hear that scientists deem free will an
illusion, they think that their powers of rational choice
and self-control have been discredited.
Laypersons in our experiments respond to critiques
of free will by cheating, stealing, aggressing, and
doing other undesirable things. Surely the scientists
and philosophers who express skepticism about free
will are not intending to promote such behaviors.
They do not even mean that “you do not have free
will, so you might as well steal money and hurt
people, and if you do those things you couldn’t really
help it anyhow.”
Possibly one interesting direction for future re-
search would be to refine the laboratory manipula-
tions to make explicit the distinctions that Mele and
Nahmias have emphasized. One group might hear
skepticism about having libertarian powers and
supernatural agency. That is, they might be told it is
false to think that two different outcomes could ensue
from exactly the same person with the same thoughts
and feelings in the same circumstances. Or they might
be told that they do not have anything like an
immaterial soul or other faculty that intervenes in
their brains to alter behavior. In contrast, a second
group might hear skepticism of their compatibilist
powers: that rationality and self-control are largely
illusory. The latter message might have a bigger
impact on antisocial behavior than the former.
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In his commentary, Mele says he remains agnostic as
to whether compatibilism is true or false. And with
good reason: Most scientists and philosophers do not
really believe determinism is viable. The strongest
contrary evidence involves quantum indeterminacy.
But as both Mele and Holton point out, quantum
indeterminacy is not really relevant to the question of
free will. Some occasional erratic veerings by
subatomic particles do not really provide much of a
conceptual basis for free will or free action in any
useful, meaningful sense.
We agree. But why do people continue to worry
about whether free will is compatible with determin-
ism, if determinism is false? The answer is because at
the macro level, things still might be strictly causal
and fully determined, or close enough that it might as
well be. (Quantum indeterminacy does entail that
once in a very great while even at the macro level
something indeterminate will happen. But those
events will be so rare as not to be worth consider-
ing, and certainly rare enough not to help theory of
free will.)
Are most laypersons compatibilists? At first blush,
no. The idea that everything is caused is initially
taken by most persons to rule out free will. We also
suspect that many scientists’ statements on the matter
stem from that same simple assumption. But as all
three commentators suggest, in reality causation can
be reconciled with free action, and most people do
believe in both free, responsible action and that
everything has a cause, so at some level they are
compatibilists. Indeed, it is precisely this fuzziness—
this sense of basic incompatibilism sitting atop a trove
of beliefs in both free action and causality—that
makes our manipulations work. If people had thought
everything through and committed to a rigorous
position, they would be less influenced by our
manipulation. We doubt, for example, that any
veteran philosopher would change his or her behavior
after sitting through our manipulation of belief for or
against free will.
One consequence of this exchange and related
discussions is that we ourselves have become more
congenial to compatibilism. Mele was exactly right
that several of our arguments have contained at least
an undercurrent of incompatibilism. To us, compati-
bilism has long seemed a gutless, namby-pamby, and
flimsy attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too. Was
it possible that the agent could have done something
different, or was it not? How can the answer be both?
But perhaps this characterization was unfair. More-
over, as all three commentators have intimated, our
research findings will appeal to compatibilists more
than libertarians.
If we were skeptical of compatibilism, it was due
in part to the assumption that the theory of free action
would have to be gutted to fit it into the straitjacket of
determinism. Instead, though, perhaps determinism
can be softened up to accommodate genuinely free
action? The next section will explore that possibility.
Finding the Basis of Multiple Possibilities
One line of thought that all of this prompts is whether
deterministic causation really rules out the multiplic-
ity of alternative possibilities in the future. In other
words, is the future just as fixed as the past? Are the
causal processes that have brought the universe this
far sufficiently rigid that the future is inevitable?
The view of free will that is hardest for many
scientists to accept is what Mele’s commentary
describes as the pure libertarian view. It holds that
given the present state of the universe down to every
precise detail, what happens next is still undecided.
According to that view, there are at least two things
that a person can do in a given situation, even with
everything about the person and the situation being
exactly as it is.
In that view, free will contains the source of
indeterminacy. Two different futures can follow from
one present. The causal sequence of the past has led
to a precise situation, including all the psychological
properties of the agent, and the agent’s free will can
produce two (or more) different futures out of this
same present.
Thinking in that style introduces a variety of
problems. Instead, perhaps it would be useful to
explore ways that a deterministic account of the
external world can still create multiple possibilities. In
that style, the purpose of the agent is to reduce that
multiplicity so as to bring about a desirable result.
Indeed, a psychological account of human behav-
ior would be almost incomprehensible without the
reality of multiple possibilities. Choice, opportunity,
threat, preference, and many other indispensable parts
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possibility that something might happen and might
not happen—that some event is possible but not
inevitable. Indeed, a recent review of empirical
findings on how consciousness affects behavior
identified as a common theme that consciousness
often has its effects in precisely the sort of circum-
stances that have multiple possible outcomes, such as
in overriding one response in favor of another,
negotiation, mental practice, and counterfactual think-
ing [1]. In that view, the purpose of the conscious
human mind is not so much to create indeterminacy
but to deal with it—that is, to sway the course of
events so that the best of several possible outcomes
occurs.
The challenge for this approach is to explain how
causal processes can produce a multiplicity of possible
outcomes.Suchataskisclearlybeyondthescopeofthis
paper. Some possible lines of analysis include the
following.First,theconfluenceofseparate,independent
causal chains creates an element of randomness as to
where they are when they intersect. Second, insofar as
symbolismisnotaphysicalfactyetcanultimatelycause
physical objects to be moved, the influence of symbolic
meaning on human action may produce results that are
not fully explicable in terms of natural law and physical
causation. Third, instead of thinking of infinite causal
chains that stretch from the Big Bang to the end of time,
it may be useful to think of discrete causal sequences
that start and stop. The result of a causal event may be
not another event but rather a situation that contains
multiple possibilities. Fourth, if people change their
behavior to avoid a particular, imminent event, then
perhaps that implies it was imminent but not inevitable.
Metaphysics and Motivation in Counterfactual
Thinking
All three commentators took us to task for our
somewhat offhand interpretation of our findings
regarding counterfactual thinking. Our study found
that manipulating belief in free will altered how many
responses people generated to the question of what
they might have done differently on an earlier
occasion from their lives during which they hurt
someone. Increasing belief in free will led to an
increase in the number of counterfactuals. Under-
mining belief in free will produced a tendency to
generate fewer responses, though that was not
significantly different from the baseline.
We said that determinists believe that what happened
was the only thing that could have happened, which
rules out counterfactuals. All three commentators
objected, and we concede the point. A strict determinist
might still think that had circumstances been different,
the result might have been different. One might have
acted differently and produced a different result.
To be sure, it is not easy for a determinist to allow
that circumstances really could have been different.
Because the chains of causation are fixed (to a
determinist), changing any one thing would mean
that prior events would have had to be different too,
and events prior to that, and so forth all the way back
to the origin of the universe. Still, a determinist can
legitimately entertain such thoughts.
In the philosophically untutored mind, which is to
say according to most modern American citizens (and
most research participants), determinism is easily
confused with fatalism. Holton’s commentary was
especially lucid and persuasive on this. Fatalism
entails that the outcome would have been the same
regardless of what the person did. Determinism says
that the person’s actions were a potentially vital,
indispensable part of producing that outcome.
The difference may not be quite as big as it first
appears. True, a determinist would say that a different
action would have produced a different outcome. But
the determinist would also say that the person could
not really have acted differently, under those exact
circumstances. (And those circumstances themselves
could not have been different, unless the causal chain
were different all the way back to the Big Bang.)
Most likely, though, our results do not stem from
philosophicalreasoning,aswehad suggested.Instead,a
change in motivation and effort was probably decisive.
To put this another way: Manipulating belief in free will
does not alter the generation of counterfactuals because
research participants draw metaphysical implications
about the deterministic implausibility of alternative
scenarios. Instead, most likely they decide whether to
bother or not.
A central finding of our research program has been
that exerting self-control, rational thought, and other
forms of free will requires effort. It is psychologically
andevenmetabolicallyexpensive.People,likeall living
things, naturally conserve energy. Hence they may be
easily persuaded to abandon self-control and other
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impression that they do not have free will, they may
gladly abandon the arduous and aversive task of
reflecting on how they should have behaved differently.
Understanding the results of our free will manipu-
lations as a change in motivation rather than a
consequence of metaphysical reasoning pulls together
our accumulated results effectively. When participants
are told that they lack free will, they (or at least some of
them) may welcome thatas anexcuse not tobotherwith
the exertions of free will. It is difficult and strenuous to
resisttemptation,toholdone’ste mp er ,andtopond erth e
implications ofone’s pastmisdeeds.Their thoughtsmay
be along the lines of, “My behavior is not a result of my
own free decision and conscious control, so why
struggle to act as if it were?” If free will meant taking
the easy and self-indulgent way out, we suspect our
manipulations would have much less discernible effect,
even if the metaphysical implications of the message
were unchanged.
Concluding Remarks
We have appreciated the opportunity to benefit
from the wisdom of our distinguished colleagues in
philosophy. We hope that experimental psychology
and philosophy can continue to inform each other.
Over the decades, choice has been a powerful,
influential concept in psychology—as is also true
of philosophy, literature, law, economics, political
science, and many other fields. Whether and in
what sense choice involves an agent actually and
freely selecting among multiple options, all of
which are genuinely possible, is an important
foundational question for psychology and indeed
for all fields that are concerned with the human
condition.
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